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Fatalism is a philosophical doctrine emphasizing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate or inevitable predetermination.
Fatalism generally refers to several of the following ideas:
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While the terms are often used interchangeably, fatalism, determinism, and predestination are discrete in emphasizing different aspects of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.
Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future, although that future is predetermined. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of all events as inevitable. In other words, determinists believe the future is fixed because of action and causality, whereas fatalists and many predestinarians think the future is ineluctable despite causality.
Therefore, in determinism, if the past were different, the present and future would differ also. For fatalists, such a question is negligible, since no other present/future/past could exist except what exists now.
Fatalism is a broader term than determinism. The presence of history indeterminisms/chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, does not exclude fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance – both can be imagined as sovereign.
One ancient argument for fatalism, called the idle argument,[3] went like this:
While the idle argument applies fatalism on the effect side (i.e., the recovery from illness), it does not apply fatalism to the cause side. Strictly speaking fatalists apply it to both sides of the cause and effect. While the fact that you will recover or not is left to fate, fatalists believe it is also pre-determined whether or not you will call the doctor.
The logical argument for fatalism is one that depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather argues based on logical necessity. There are numerous versions of this argument, but the most famous are by Aristotle[4] and Richard Taylor[5]. These have been objected to and elaborated on[6] but very few people accept them.
The key idea of logical fatalism is that there is a body of true propositions (statements) about what is going to happen, and these are true regardless of when they are made. So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would be not be true today that such a battle will take place.
The argument relies heavily on the principle of bivalence, the idea that any proposition is either true or false. As a result of this principle, if it is not false that there will be a sea battle, then it is true; there is no in-between. However, rejecting the principle of bivalance—perhaps by saying that the truth of a proposition about the future is indeterminate—is a controversial view, since the principle is an accepted part of classical logic.
Another problem with logical fatalism is that first you must accept there is a timeless set of all propositions which exist without being proposed by anyone in particular. Constructivists (a school of thought in logic and maths) would argue that this is not the case, and that propositions only exist when they are constructed, or expressed.
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